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William stoecker at first seemed to be a hugely successful
entrepreneur.

By the time he was 30, he had borrowed enough

money to make him look like "Chicago's version of Donald Trump,"
and his accountants had figured he had enough money to make him
one of the 200 richest people in America.l
His entrepreneurial

talent, however, lied in the fact that

he is what many have referred to as "a natural con man. ,,2 He
faced the nation's leading financial institutions and came away
with what would amount to about a half a billion dollars in
loans.

The catch

is that Mr. Stoecker

wasn't

making

money

to pay

off these loans, but rather he was paying off the loans with new
loans.

His methods were similar to a sophisticated

check kiting

scheme.
One naturallJ wonders how he could get away with half a
billion dollars in loans if his companies were not making the
kind of money needed to support these loans.

Part of the reason

is that Bill Stoecker is a very persuasive man and knew how to
"cloud a banker's vision, stun his mind, [and] open the vaults. ,,3
When his charm alone was no longer enough, he hired the

Gelber,

"Whiz Kid,"

p. 3.

2

Silberman, "The Fall of the House of Stoecker," p. 176.

3

Ibid.

~
2

~
-

accounting firm of Laventhol & Horwath to certify his financial
statements.

stoecker and his Grabill Corp. were able to acquire millions
of dollars in loans based on financial statements audited by

-

Laventhol & Horwath which reported assets at greatly inflated

~

at millions of dollars each.

-

values and which reported subsidiaries, which did not even exist,
The Grabill case will be discussed

in detail as a prime example of the type of clients and sloppy or
fraudulent audit work that led to Laventhol's demise.

This paper

~

will also briefly detail the other problems Laventhol was having

-

conditions in the accounting industry will be looked at in an

~
8
-

that contributed to their eventual bankruptcy.

Finally, current

attempt to show that Laventhol's plight is somewhat a sign of the
times.

II

3
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WILLIAM

STOECKER

Stoecker's Backaround.
William Stoecker,

2

AND HIS GRABILL

who was the chairman

CORPORATION

and sole

shareholder

of Grabill corporation, grew up in Oak Forest, Illinois.

Oak

Forest is a small town which is about 20 miles southwest of
II

II

II

II

Chicago's Loop.
Catholic

family

Stoecker was the only surviving son in a devout
of eight.

He attended

where he was an altar boy on Sundays.

st. Damian's

grade

school

Stoecker also attended Oak

Forest High School where he played football and basketball for
two years.

Stoecker started working in his father's fencing

business at the age of eleven and earned money which reportedly
made him a big spender among his friends.

When Stoecker was only

II

18

II

sixteen
a team

and most

of his friends

of snow plows.4

Finally,

were

shoveling

snow,

he organized

he had set up a welding

operation in which he was earning $100,000 a year by the time he
was

twenty.

5

In the late 1970's, Stoecker dropped out of Moraine Valley
II

II

I

I
I
I
I

Community College after just one semester.

His plan was to

borrow money to fix up homes on which banks had foreclosed.6

In

1980 or 1981 he had accompanied his father out to the south
suburban town of Frankfort to see an abandoned house he was going

4

Banas, "High-tech center given $10 million," p. 6.

5 Silberman,
6

"The Fall of the House

Gelber, "Whiz Kid,"

p.

2.

of Stoecker,"

p. 177.

II
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i
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to buy.

4
The house had holes in its walls big enough for a person

to walk through.

It had been vandalized and there were animal

carcasses lying on the buckling floors.

Stoecker told his dad

that he had been reading "those books that tell you how to make a
million dollars in real estate in three years."
his father, "I'm on my way."
came as a surprise.

Stoecker said to

The reaction he got from his father

His father, Frank Stoecker, was a very

religious man (who had studied for the priesthood), and Stoecker
said he had never before heard his father swear.

However, upon

seeing this house, his father said to him "You know, you're an
18

18

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

asshole.

I'm not gonna be able to talk any sense into yoU.,,7

Grabill CorD. Beains Business.
Despite his father's disapproval, Stoecker began to buy
houses

that

Grabill

the banks

Corporation.

had foreclosed

(The name Grabill

names "Grace" and "Bill".
married in 1982.)

on.

In 1981, he founded
is a combination

of the

Grace was Stoecker's wife whom he had

In four years (1980-1984), Stoecker claimed

that his corporation had earned $70 million by rehabbing houses
and selling them at a profit.

Stoecker learned that he could buy

houses without using any of his own money.

He was obtaining 100

percent financing or more from thrifts or banks on foreclosed
Chicago residential homes.

The situation in the distressed real

estate market in the late '70s made savings and loans so eager to
get bad loans off their books that they would cut prices and give
Stoecker

110 percent

financing

(with the extra

going

into the

I
I
I

7

Silberman,

"The Fall of the House

of Stoecker,"

p. 177.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
I
I

5
rehabilitations)
houses

with

borrowed

It occurred to Stoecker, "If you could buy

.8

borrowed

money?

money,

why not also buy companies

with

,,9

The midwest economy in the early '80s was in pretty bad
shape, and Stoecker began to use borrowed money to purchase
undercapitalized

companies and then fund their growth.10 The

midwest area in which Stoecker was buying up operating companies
is sometimes referred to as the Rust Belt.

Stoecker would later

explain, "There's a rich little vein of manufacturing

companies

out there[.]

lending

became

We discovered them before middle-market

the rage.

So, in 1984,

Now we look like geniuses.,,11
he began

to buy operating

companies.

His first

purchases were Midway Cap Company of Chicago which he purchased
for $1 million and North Star Van & Storage of Milwaukee which he
purchased

for $800,000.

additional

companies

Die Casting,

Detroit

Between

including
Armor,

1984 and 1987 he acquired

Fulton

Market

and Cook's

Cold

Cupboard.12

Storage,

29
Allied

Eventually,

his largest purchase was that of the aerospace operations of

I

Fruehauf Corp., which he renamed Grabill Aerospace Industries.13

I

8 Elsner
ineptitude?,"
9

I
I
I
I
I

Gelber,

and Sly,
p. 5.

"Grabill

"Whiz kid,"

10

King,

"Love

11

Ibid.

p. 78.

12

Silberman,

13

Reed,

Those

case:

Matter

of fraud

or

p. 2.
Gullible

Bankers,"

"The Fall of the House

p. 79.

of Stoecker,"

pp. 177,

178.
"Bankruptcy

rocks

Stoecker's

empire,"

p. 67.

II

Ii

Ii

I
I
I

I

Stoecker wanted Grabill
He would leave the
operations
company

6
Corporation to be a diverse

Conglomerate.
companies' managements
intact and leave

decentralized.

after

I bought

He stated,

it was that

"The only change
instead of making

in a

obscene

profits, it would make obscene loan payments.
,,14

When it all
came down to the end, Stoecker had built a corporate
empire which

had 31 operating

companies.

The Life of a
Millionaire.
The Grabill
headquarters

Cicero in Oak Forest.
r

and three-story

brown

were

constructed

There were three
brick

at 150th

and

buildings which were two-

structures.

communicate to the bankers

Their

purpose:

to

"Grabill's propriety,
stability and
Visitors to the Grabill
complex would enter the
elevator in what would appear to be a common
suburban office
center, but when they stepped
wealth."

off the elevator,
18th century
with an art

England.
collection

art and artifacts.

The Grabill
consisting

office

center

of 300 pieces

the scene

was

was

decorated
of 18th century

There were original

works by Gainsborough,
Turner, Rossetti,
and Stubbs. The collection
also contained
Nelson's strong box, and silver
Lord
flatware that Napoleon had given
his sister as a Wedding gift.
Lenders were flown in and out via
a corporate
helicopter and Were given a tour of the incredible
Grabill complex with its
wined and dined by

14

magnificent art
collection. They were
Stoecker's personal
chef in the executive

Silberman, "The Fall of the House of
Stoecker," p. 178.

II
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7
dining room which sported silk walls and an antique Persian
carpet.

The deals were then closed in the boardroom or in front

of the marble fireplace in the suite.u
stoecker's homes were all very impressive too.

He bought up

three homes in Palos Park at 12413-12419 Hobart Avenue

(which

would later be on the market for 1.85 million) .16

The main house
had four bedrooms and was done in a French country style, which
stoecker and his wife had personally selected from a group of
style plans.

The house itself was not that spectacular, but it

had the equivalent of a health club grafted to one side complete
with basketball court.

The other houses were acquired to house

his domestic staff and bodyguards.
stoecker's personal pilot.
helicopter,

One of the houses was for

Stoecker had acquired three jets, a

and a stretch Mercedes Benz limousine to make it

easier to visit his operating companies and his other multimillion dollar home on the Gulf Front in Naples, Florida.n
Finally, he had a home in Lake Forest which would go on the

market at $1.5 million during bankruptcy proceedings.18
Stoecker was very careful about security too.

He took out a

kidnapping

insurance policy on himself and hired armed

bodyguards.

His home was under 24 hour surveillance.

At the

Grabill office complex it took two codes to reach the top
15

Ibid.

16

Okon, "Stoecker

17

Silberman,

18 Okon,

legal fees queried,"

"The Fall of the House

"Stoecker

legal

fees queried,

p. 1.

of Stoecker,"

" p. 3.

p. 178.

II
18
II
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8

executive offices on the third floor.

Surveillance cameras

watched visitors from hidden niches and visitor's passes even
changed color if worn outside.

In fact, even most of the people

working on the second floor of the complex couldn't get into the
executive offices unescorted.~
While Stoecker's company was growing, Stoecker himself was
becoming Oak Forest's favorite businessman.
became

the town's

organizations
million

largest

employed

for fiscal

employer.

5,500 people

year

1988.

Grabill Corporation

Overall,

Stoecker's

and reported

Oak Forest

revenues

had never

of $750

seen

Christmas decorations on Cicero avenue until Stoecker donated the
money

for them.

He also donated

$58,000

to his high

school

so

that they could purchase lights for the football field.
Even Moraine Valley Community College of Palos Hills where
Stoecker spent one semester was given $4 million dollars to help
build a performing arts center.

The donation, which was believed

to be the second largest endowment ever given to a community
college, was intended to build a 1,200 seat theater and an art
gallery.

For Moraine Valley, the donation was 20 times larger

than what the school's entire foundation would normally receive
even in its best years.20
making

good

19

on

about

Silberman,

(Stoecker, however only ended up

$2 million

gift).

"The Fall of the House

20 Ryan, "That's gratitude:
donation from dropout," p. 10.
21

of the

school

21

of Stoecker,"
receives

p. 178.

$4 million

Looby, "MVCC hit with $90,000 legal bill over Stoecker

gift," p. A-I.

,
[

I
9

j
Ii

I
I
I

still another donation was planned for the Illinois
Institute of Technology

(lIT) for $10 million.

The money was

supposed to help build a high-tech campus in the heart of the
Illinois research and development corridor in Du Page County.
originally both the University of Illinois and Northern Illinois
University had wanted to be the leader among a group of colleges
which would collectively set up a separate "multi-university"
this area.

in

However, after a number of years without receiving

II

II

funds, lIT took the initiative to start the project based on the
fact that they could move faster because they were a private
university.22

So it seemed to most people that Stoecker really knew what

II
Ii
II

he was doing.

He was a phenomenal

success

story.

By the time

Stoecker was 30, his accountants figured he had enough money to
make him one of the 200 richest people in America.23 But what
made

Bill

Stoecker,

phenomenal success?

a community

college

dropout,

such a

Neither stoecker nor the rest of his

III

II
II
I
I

executive staff was experienced in mergers and acquisitions.
Stoecker referred to his executives as "the mutants" because they
were thrown into positions they were not trained for and had to
adapt quickly.

Stoecker intended to bring people along, "making

it up as they went."

Many people outside of the company felt,

however, that many of these executives were in over their heads.
The chief

executive

n Banas,
23

officer,

"High-tech

Gelber, "Whiz Kid,"

Philip

center

p.

3.

Ignarski,

given

had worked

$10 million,"

p. 1.

in a

III

10
local

law practice

where

he specialized

business, and divorce."

in "real

estate,

The vice president of planning, Lawrence

Pluhar, was also the helicopter pilot.

The chief financial

officer, Richard Bock, had some experience in accounting, and
arranging the manufacture
"Mrs.

Durkin's

Old

and distribution of a product called

Fashion

Lickers.,,24

III
Problems Beain for Stoecker.
The first rift in the story came after the release of the
III
III

II

Ii

.
.
.
.
II
II
II
II

I

October

31, 1988 edition

of Forbes

magazine.

The article

in

Forbes was entitled "Love Those GUllible Bankers," and it came in
response to an article published in the Chicago Tribune a year
earlier which was called "The Oak Forest Whiz Whom Forbes
Missed."

The Tribune reported that Stoecker's net worth
exceeded
$250 million and that therefore Stoecker belonged
on the Forbes
Four Hundred list. Forbes looked into Stoecker's
situation and
reported that "with Bill Stoecker there is less than meets the
eye.

Far from being a centimillionaire,

Bill Stoecker may have

several million or even no millions at all...It depends on whose
figures

you

believe.

,,25

The Forbes article brought a number of facts to the world's
attention, specifically dealing with two of his operating
companies:

Capitol Technologies

Detroit Armor.

Apparently Stoecker had paid $5 million cash to

acquire Capitol Technologies
24 Silberman,
~ King,

(South Bend, Indiana) and

in 1984.

Stoecker claimed that the

"The Fall of the House

"Love Those

Gullible

of Stoecker,"

Bankers,"

p. 76.

p. 178.

.
.
.
.
.

11
$5 million was raised through profits in his rehab work.

The

article stated, however, that "evidence available to Forbes
suggests he didn't make anything like that in real estate.

He

was a small-scale operator, and only for a brief period."u
Forbes reported that within a year, capitol's debt had risen
from $400,000 to $5.5 million and that the retained earnings of
over $2 million had shrunk to under $350,000.

Stoecker would

later admit to Forbes that he put virtually no equity into the
deal and that he had essentially bought Capitol with its own
assets.

Stoecker had given a different story to General Motors.

GM, one of Capitol's biggest customers, was informed by Stoecker
that Grabill had virtually no debt and that there was "little
leverage" in the purchase of Capitol.v
Stoecker also handed a similar story to AmeriTrust banking
company.

After assuring AmeriTrust that Grabill had virtually no

debt and that operations were going well, AmeriTrust agreed to
lend Grabill Corp. $15 million.

Forbes reported that they were

able to learn of internal records which reported that Grabill's
debt level was already $15 million by 1985, not to mention the
decreases of Grabill's retained earnings of $2.5 million in '85
and $3.7 million in 1986.

Additionally,

Stoecker had promised

audited financials to AmeriTrust which he never produced even a
year later.

U

Ibid.

v Ibid.

Further reported in the Forbes article was that

p. 79.

III

18

18

18
18

12
stoecker had asked Salomon Brothers (an investment banking firm)
for a $150 million loan through a loan syndication.28
The financials that were given to Salomon claimed that
Grabill would be worth $219 million on the open market.
Salomon wanted more solid information.
forthcoming and negotiations stalled.

But

The information was not
The table below shows some

II
18

of the information which was given to Salomon Brothers compared
to information that people with firsthand knowledge of Grabill's
books provided to Forbes:

II
FIGURES
GIVEN TO
SALOMON

II

Sales

Gain/(loss)

FIGURES
ACQUIRED BY
FORBES
Sales

II

Detroit
(Fiscal

Armor
1987)

$10.7mill

$960,000

$5.1mill

III

Capitol
(Fiscal

Tech.
1986)

$22.78mill

$4.16mill

$11. 65mill

III

Gain/(loss)
<LOSS>

2.6mill

Forbes reported that not only were the numbers which Stoecker
gave to Salomon wrong, but also that Laventhol & Horwath used

II
III

II

those same figures to prepare a personal balance sheet for
Stoecker.

unaudited numbers showed a net worth for Stoecker in mid-1987 of
$332 million.
figures,

II
II
II
II

The article stated, "This mixture of audited and

estimates.

Even though Salomon would not vouch for the

Laventhol

accepted

,,29

U Ibid.

pp. 79,83.

29 Ibid.

p.

83.

them as the basis

for its

.
.
II

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

The publication

13
of the Forbes article worried a lot of banks

especially the Bank of New England consortium

(which had opened a

Chicago lending office to make loans in the Rust Belt) that
loaned

Grabill

$150 million.

The article

shocked

and embarrassed

the Bank of New England because it noted that the bank had loaned
Grabill the $150 million requiring no collateral because of
Grabill's apparent financial strength.

How did the Bank of New

England determine that Grabill was financially sound?

It was

based on financial statements which Laventhol & Horwath had
prepared!30
(initiated

Finally,
by eight

Grabill
banks

would

be forced

into bankruptcy

led by the Bank of New England)

missing a principal payment of $2.5 million.

(A larger interest

payment of $3.8 million which was due at the same time was made
on time.)31 The Bank of New England had promised to lend Grabill
more money (which would have enabled Grabill to meet its
payment), but backed out on their promise after the publication
of the article in Forbes magazine.

So, after an attempt by The

Bank of New England and its consortium to force Grabill into
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Grabill filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
February 3, 1989 (and was eventually placed under Chapter 11).32
r

I

f

after

30

Ibid.

31 Elsner
ineptitude?,"

and Sly,
p. 3.

"Grabill

case:

Matter

of fraud

r

32 Orr,

"Grabill

founder

man of mystery,"

p.

8.

or

I
I
I
I

14
Grabill/stoecker
BankruDtcv
Proceedinas.
The bankruptcy
did not go very smoothly.

proceedings
Grabill.

Early

in the

a judge required that new attorneys be appointed for

There was a conflict of interest situation because

Grabill's original attorneys had also represented Stoecker
I

I

I

personally,

and Stoecker had subsequently resigned from

Grabill.33 There were also a number of allegations made by the
banks which had loaned Grabill or Stoecker money.

One allegation

was that Stoecker had used Grabill funds for his personal
benefit.

On February 2, 1989, an interim trustee was appointed

I

I

I

~

I

I

I

to investigate bank charges against Grabill and to trace a
reported $100 million that the banks accused Stoecker of
siphoning from Grabill.~

Coopers & Lybrand was hired to help

track down the $100 million; and it proved to be a time consuming
process.

Harris Bank & Trust attorney Nathan Elmer voiced his

opinion about the difficulty of tracing the $100 million.
referred to it as "a simple question...Mr.

He

Stoecker should be

able to tell us in 10 minutes or less."ll
In yet other charges, The Bank of New England charged
Stoecker with forging a letter which purported to give Stoecker a
"free hand" in the use of their loan.

The letter was allegedly

written by Donna Pellegrini, The Bank of New England's vice
I

president.

The letter exempted his real estate assets from the

I

I

,

I

33
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terms of a loan.

If it was found to be genuine, Stoecker was

entitled to dispose of real estate assets.36 It was later
determined by a document expert to be genuine.

Another expert

noted that the letter in question was a facsimile and contained a
coding on the bottom of the facsimile reproduction which was
produced by the receiving facsimile machine.
code proved
machine

that

the original

at the Chicago

office

letter

This "receiving"

was transmitted

of the Bank of New

from the

England.

37

There were also a number of criminal charges for bankruptcy
fraud for not disclosing assets.

Charges were made that Stoecker

didn't report $900,000 in assets to the bankruptcy trustee.

Part

of this money was found in an April 15th FBI raid on Stoecker's
home.

Among the assets found by the FBI in a safe at Stoecker's

home were:
-$300,000 in negotiable
checks including
transferred
into a maid's bank account.
-A $500,000

promissory

5 that were

note.

-Written appraisals of jewelry totaling $100,000.
-$12,000 in cash and $3,000 in travelers checks.
Some of the $300,000
maid's

bank

expenses.

account

in checks

were

on the advice

apparently

of a lawyer

transferred

to the

to pay household

It was determined that the promissory note had already

been used and that the jewelry belonged to his wife who had
divorced him.
~ Sly,

He was eventually indicted on May 16th for hiding

"Accountants

can't

find chunk

of Grabill

assets,"

p. 4.
37 Elsner,

"Ex-chief

stands

by Grabill

deals,"

p.

1.

I
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$255,000 in assets from the bankruptcy trustee overseeing his
38

estate.

other

charges

were made

that

Stoecker

withdrew

from company accounts and shredded financial

$30 million

(loan) documents. 39

There was eventually concern about where Stoecker was getting
money

to pay his

would

not disclose

legal

fees.

the names

Thomas

Durkin,

of the people

Stoecker's

paying

lawyer,

for Stoecker's

legal fees because the third parties did not want to be
identified.

In criminal proceedings, parties often pay legal

fees and remain undisclosed.

However, since this was a

bankruptcy case, the lawyer was forced to disclose this
information to ensure that the legal fees were not coming from
money that Stoecker had transferred to third parties.~
The bankruptcy trustees themselves were not without blame
for the problems occurring during the bankruptcy.

Trustee Thomas

Raleigh at one point had rerouted Stoecker's mail to his own
office.

Stoecker's attorney, Thomas Durkin, argued that this

constituted an illegal search and seizure without a warrant.
Raleigh took this action to help insure that information was not
being withheld from him.

He noted to bankruptcy Judge John

Squires that he had learned of a $1.5 million certificate of
deposit at Hayes National Bank in Clinton, New York, only because
a $10,500

payment

38 Okon,

had been addressed

"Stoecker

indicted,"

to Stoecker

at the Grabill

pp. A1, A4.

39

Reed, "Bankruptcy rocks Stoecker's empire," p. 67.

~

Okon, "Stoecker legal fees queried," p.

1.
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headquarters.41

Raleigh rerouted Stoecker's personal mail

because he thought information about other undisclosed
might be revealed through mail correspondence

assets

at Stoecker's

personal address. However, Raleigh did not open the mail he
received because he learned his actions would be contested.

In

June '89, Judge Squires ordered the mail (which had not been
opened since May 3rd) to be turned over to Stoecker's attorney.42
There were also complications during the seizure of
corporate assets which were to be auctioned to liquidate Grabill
Corp.

The seizure of the Grabill art collection and other assets

(including one of the airplanes which had been tagged by a deputy
at Midway Airport in Chicago) was halted.

The seizure was

stopped due to disputes concerning whether the assets were part
of Grabill Corp. or part of Stoecker's personal assets.43 with
all the confusion and lack of documentation

in the records, it

was very difficult in the proceedings to determine who actually
owned the assets even after they were found.

In the final

i

II

II
II
II
~

.

bankruptcy settlement made with the eight bank consortium that
forced Grabill into bankruptcy, a special arrangement was made.
Rather than sharing in distributions

in a pro-rata fashion, an

agreement was made to allow smaller banks with loans under
$50,000 to be paid in full before distributing the remainder to
the larger banks.
~

Okon,

"Trustee

42

Okon,

"Stoecker

43 Okon,

"Grabill

wants

access

legal
property

to Stoecker's

fees queried,"
seizure

mail,"

p. 3.

blocked,"

p.

1.
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So william stoecker fooled the world.

In a memo that

circulated in one of the banks that loaned stoecker money, it was
reported that he was somewhat "unsophisticated"
operated.

about how banks

with hindsight one might argue that he knew exactly

what he was doing.

He new how to charm a banker.

alone made him into a "success" for a while.

His charm

A comment by an

officer from a regional bank which had loaned stoecker money
without audited financials, reported that he felt "the magnitude
was so great, if even half of it was true you thought you had
something.
did

a lot

It's clear now I didn't do my homework, but neither
of

other

44 silberman,

bankers.,,44

"The Fall of the House

of Stoecker,"

p. 207.

.
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CHAPTER
LAVENTHOL

'HORWATH:

3

A TROUBLED

PARTNERSHIP

I

While the Grabill episode eventually resulted in the
dismantling of Laventhol & Horwath, it was by no means the only
event which seemed to result in a questioning of the integrity
and reliability of this firm's work.

Grabill corporation wasn't

the beginning of their problems; it was just the nail in the
coffin.

..
.

After two decades of tremendous growth, Laventhol was
besieged by a myriad of problems that quickly led to its demise.
What happened?

Was the quality in their work really lost?

The

following sections attempt to look back at the dynamic growth of
Laventhol & Horwath over the past two decades, the numerous
difficulties

that

befell

the firm

in the late 1980's,

and the

eventual collapse of the firm under the pressure of the Grabill

I

~

,
~

case.
Too Much Too Fast? - Was Qualitv Jeooardized?
Some would suggest that the start of Laventhol & Horwath's
problems really began with their overwhelming drive for bigness
starting back in the late 1960's.

Many years ago, Laventhol &

Horwath was not the big accounting firm that it had become in the
few years before its bankruptcy.
tremendous growth.

Laventhol experienced

Much of this growth came through mergers.

Between 1968 and 1980 they had acquired no less than 70 other
firms.

In one single year, Laventhol had acquired 13 additional

I
20

I
I

firms.

Along

with

the acquisitions,

'80-'86

revenue

grew

fourfold while revenue in the period from '86 to '90 grew 28%
more.45 Even with fierce competition in the industry for audit

I

.

.
I
,
-

.

clients, Laventhol's u.s. revenue grew in the last 10 years from
$70.8 million to an estimated $350 million in 1990.~
Despite the firms growth, they began to have a number of
highly publicized
worst

legal claims, of which the most publicized and

(so far) has been the Grabill/stoecker

case.

The Grabill

case was called by one partner "the darkest day in the firm's
history."

All of the people who worked on the Grabill audits

were eventually released or had resigned.~

Lawsuits have

charged that the firm had ignored professional principles to
achieve growth.

In the past three years Laventhol has paid out

over $50 million in claims resulting from sloppy audit work.48
Additionally,

Laventhol revealed during their filing for Chapter

11 protection that the firm had at least 100 lawsuits pending
seeking over $2 billion in damages.49
The chicago office of Laventhol & Horwath was one of the
largest

of the Laventhol

offices.

Overall,

45 Berton, "Laventhol
Into Hard Times," p. A1.

& Horwath,

Beset

~ Cohen
accounting,"

"Laventhol

woes

47

Ibid.

48

Cohen,

49 Pae,

and Goozner,
p. 6.
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I

425 partners
with
faced

over

in 51 offices.50

400 employees.51

resulted

The chicago

Many

from audits

office

of the lawsuits

performed

had
that

by the chicago

35 partners
Laventhol
office.

Kenneth Solomon was the managing partner of the Chicago office
and was highly regarded at one time for building the Chicago
office to be the 6th largest accounting operation in the city,
from being number 16 only twelve years earlier.

He helped to

make Laventhol into the city's biggest firm that specialized in
mid-sized, privately held companies with annual revenues in the
area

of $2 to $150

problems

however,

million. 52 When
Solomon

began

Laventhol

began

to experience

to lose his popularity.

Some

people blamed Solomon for being too aggressive in trying to cut
costs by cutting staff numbers.

Among other shortcomings,

Solomon actively solicited Stoecker's business.
Amid

Laventhol's

legal problems,

the newspapers

focus on the downside to Laventhol's growth.

began

to

In 1989 operating

profits before litigation costs dropped by 9% and average
earnings for the partners

(after legal payouts) declined 35%.53

Then, in 1990, the firm decided not to issue financial statements
for the first time in 10 years.

50 Berton, "Laventhol
unit and Key Executives,"
51 Elsner and Cohen,
protection."
p. 3.
~ Cohen
accounting,"
53 Cohen,

and Goozner,
p. 6.
"Charting

Unlike a corporation, businesses

& Horwath
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add to debate
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set up as partnerships

(like accounting firms) are not required

to publish financial statements for the public.

However,

Laventhol had previously prepared financial statements to
highlight the tremendous growth it was having.

When asked why

they were not releasing financial statements, a spokesman
replied, "Why bother?" and refused to admit the reason was
related to Laventhol's problems.~

A Mountain of Lawsuits...Not Just Grabill.
Following its years of tremendous growth, the 1980's brought
Laventhol a myriad of legal problems which seem to question the
quality of the work being performed by this firm.

In fact, by

the time of its eventual filing for bankruptcy in 1990, Laventhol
& Horwath had more than 100 lawsuits outstanding for claims in
excess of $2 billion dollars.

Grabill was by no means the first

warning to Laventhol that it needed to look at the quality of
their work...it was simply their last.

Was it to Laventhol &

Horwath management that something needed to be done and, if so,
was it simply too late or did their management knowingly choose
to ignore the firms growing problems?
Looking at the different claims Laventhol was facing
indicates that at least some of them may have been preventable.
In the summer of 1982, a senior staff member sent his boss a memo
questioning deductions Laventhol was taking while preparing tax
returns for several limited partnerships.

~ Ibid.

In the memo which was

~

I
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written to the New York managing partner Leonard Douglas

(by

Lawrence Reisman and his boss, Martin Helpbern), issues were
raised such as if Laventhol's

"reputation as a 'professional

firm' [would be] enhanced by our association with this type of
'sham?'" and if "the loss of reputation... [would be] compensated
by the present $ [money] generated?"ss The response to the memo
given by Douglas concerning the invalid deductions was that,
"Every person is entitled to be represented by as competent a

professional as he can get

Even in criminal law, there is a

guaranteed right under the constitution.

The client is entitled

I

to representation. "S6 Laventhol & Horwath continued to work for
the limited partnership

for the next 3 years.

Eventually, the

I

I

I

IRS disallowed the deductions claimed by Terra Drill & oil's
investors.

In December of 1989, a federal jury made a $72

million dollar judgment against Laventhol for violating antifraud
statutes in working for the shelter.

Laventhol eventually

settled for $13.5 million of which only $4.4 million was covered
I

I

I

by insurance.

Laventhol had offered to settle before the trial

for $5 million.

Douglas later resigned.

Reisman,

(who wrote the

memo), left Laventhol in 1983.

He set up a tax practice in New

York.

about

He claimed

standards.

to be "upset"

Laventhol's

professional

"The urge to take such risks there was too

I

I

I

I

I

ferocious...The
~ Cohen
accounting,"

dog-eat-dog atmosphere and knowledge that if you

and Goozner,
p. 1.

~ Berton,

"Laventhol

Into Hard Times," p. A-l.
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weren't willing to cut a corner, someone else would be found
,,57
there

who

will,

was

too

much

for

me.

Again in 1988, Laventho1 made an out-of-court settlement for
$15 million in a suit it lost under the Racketeer Influenced and
corrupt

Organizations

(RICO)

law.

(This made Laventho1 the first

accounting firm to lose a case under RICO.)

The jury ruled that

investors relying on financial statements audited by Laventho1
invested $20 million into fraudulent cattle-breeding
which later collapsed.

The collapse resulted in the investors

also being hit with tax penalties.
I

insurance

covered

Although

this

Grabill

tax shelters

loss.

Laventho1 reported that

58

corporation

created

one of Laventho1's

I

I

I

biggest

suits,

another

lawsuit

which

stemmed

from a Chicago

office client is that of Convenient Food Mart.

Laventho1 was

charged with not adequately reviewing and checking working papers
which were prepared by Convenient.

It was later revealed by

Convenient that they had overstated 1987

profits by

68%.59

Yet

I

I

I

another Chicago office related lawsuit is that of Wiebo1dt stores
Inc.

Laventho1 issued a report which stated that a leveraged

buy-out of the company would not make it insolvent.

managers were later sued for running the company into the ground

I

I

57

Ibid.

58

Ibid.

59

Ibid.

I

I

I

stockho1der-

p. A-8.
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and they charged, in the same court, that Laventhol had
misrepresented

Wieboldt's finances.~

Laventhol also faced litigation in connection with work done
for Evangelist Jim Bakker's PTL ministries.

A number of

investors with "lifetime memberships" charged that a fraud had
been perpetrated

against them.

The suit alleged that Laventhol
turning what was a $19 million
helped Bakker "cook the books" by
paper. This was done through a
loss into a $26 million profit on
lifetime partner income.
change in the method of amortizing
qualify its 1986 audit opinion
(Laventhol would argue that it did
based in part from reservations about PTL's finances.)
was charging $180,000 a year in audit fees.

Laventhol

The suit charged

that $60,000 of this amount was given to Laventhol to maintain a
"secret bank account" that was used to conceal allegedly
embezzled
client

funds

by top officers.

in 1984 after

for "unexplained
in its thirst

Deloitte,

reasons."

for growth.

Laventhol
Haskins

This,

& Sells

however,

Although

took the PTL as a
dropped

the client

did not stop Laventhol

they received

$180,000

a year

in audit fees, Laventhol eventually wound up with a lawsuit
seeking $184 million.M
Le al Problems Lead to partner Defections and Cash Shorta es.
Beset by this myriad of legal problems, the downward spiral
of Laventhol was accelerated by the battle for leadership within
~ Cohen
accounting,"

and Goozner,
p. 6.

61 Berton,

"Laventhol

Into Hard Times," P. A-8.
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I

t

the firm,

the abrupt

defection

of many partners,

inability

of the firm to raise

sufficient

and the

cash to keep

its

operations going.
I

While Laventhol was proceeding through its difficulties, the

I

once hailed Kenneth Solomon was competing for the position of
I
chief executive officer of Laventhol & Horwath, a job which he
had long coveted; however, in 1989 he was passed over for this
job and the position was filled by Robert Levine who was a
managing

partner

from San Francisco.

Also,

during

1989,

Solomon

was voted out of the position of chairman which he had held for
the 10 years

prior

to 1989.

Solomon's

problems

seemed

to grow

as

Laventhol's did, which seems to corroborate the blame which many
partners placed on Solomon for Laventhol's legal problems
resulting from audits done by the Chicago office.62 It was not
long before Solomon resigned as head of the Chicago office and
was replaced by Sheldon Epstein.

Epstein pledged tighter quality

controls, but Laventhol was already beyond help.
Laventhol's problems began to compound from the beginning.
Besides losing Solomon, Laventhol was experiencing many partner
defections because of the problems that the firm was
experiencing.

From the beginning

numbers declined about 17%.~

62

p.

Cohen,

"Laventhol

of 1989 until

mid-1990

partner

Bruce Richman, a health-care

chairman

isn't re-elected

to job,"

14.

63 Cohen,

"Charting

quality
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Laventhol
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p.
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consultant at Laventhol, when asked why he was leaving replied,
"It's

no secret

about

what's

going

on at Laventhol.,,64

More trouble for Laventhol came when they lost their Toronto
office which consisted of about 30 partners and 200 professional
staff.

The office was one of four Canadian offices of Laventhol

and Horwath, the other three being in Vancouver, Winnipeg, and
Montreal.
million

Revenue from the Toronto office amounted to about $25

Canadian

dollars

($21.3 million

u.s. dollars).

The

Toronto office was a very important office in making Laventhol an
international firm.

The office defected to Price Waterhouse.

Eric Slavens, co-managing partner of the Toronto office,
indicated their reasons for defecting as being "because we need
more cross-country
of Laventhol's

coverage for clients in Canada."~

In light

circumstances, however, other motives would appear

to have been present.
At the same time that Laventhol was facing so many difficult
lawsuits, partner defections, and other related problems, the
firm also began to experience serious cash flow problems.

In an

attempt to mitigate these problems, in October of 1990 Laventhol
put into effect a 10% pay cut across the country for its 3,300
employees.

It was stated that the pay cut was implemented to

mitigate further layoffs.
1990 pension

64

unit

benefits

Additionally, the firm cut its October

to its partners.

A spokesman

for Laventhol

Berton, "Laventhol & Horwath Faces More Woes As It Loses

and Key Executives,"
65 Ibid.

p. A-2.
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in Philadelphia

stated "we have paid this month and will pay next

month...but we don't divulge how much we pay."

One retired

partner, however, indicated that his pension benefit check was
cut by about 80%.

Although the firm indicated that all pension

benefits would be paid by May 15th (the end of the pension year).
The cash squeeze, combined with the fact that Laventhol had an
unfunded pension plan which was paid out of current earnings,
resulted in the reduction of the current benefits being paid.
Originally, CEO Robert Levine had recommended that the pension
benefits be suspended completely until after January 31st;
however, this recommendation was settled through the 80%
reduction compromise.

The future would show that Laventhol would

not even last until January 31st.~
still experiencing cash flow problems, partners met in
Houston and rejected a proposal to pump $15 million in funds into
Laventhol

(which would have amounted to about $50,000 for each of

its 320 partners).

None of Laventhol's main lenders, which

included Chase Manhattan Bank and Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia,
were willing to give additional loans.~

Chase Manhattan Bank

had already placed 3 employees at Laventhol's Philadelphia office
to monitor receivables for their $80 million loan package {double

I

~ Cohen,

"Laventhol

retirees

find pension

check

cut 80%," p.

2.
67

Elsner and Cohen, "Top accounting firm may seek

protection," p.

3.
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what Laventhol had borrowed prior to 1990).Q

The bank had

suggested earlier in 1990 that Laventhol sell off two of its
divisions, Construction Monitoring and Valuation Counselors, in
order "to put the accounting firm on a sounder financial
footing."

Construction Monitoring was based in New York.

It

"value[d] construction projects for financial institutions and
monitor [ed] conformance
revenue

amounted

Counselors

to about

valued

[had performed]

with

construction-loan

$3 to $4 million

"businesses,

real-estate

assets,

agreements."

per year.

property

and health-care

Valuation

and equipment

facility

Its

and

appraisals."

Valuation Counselors was based in chicago and had annual revenues
of over $19 million.~

The Nail in the Coffin: Grabill.
While some of the earlier lawsuits might have indicated that
something had been lost in the quality of Laventhol's work, the
Grabill case clearly brought this issue to the attention of the
public,

the accounting

industry,

and the courts,

once again.

What was so wrong with their work on the Grabill
Corporation?

Even inexperienced auditors would seem to

understand the need to look at documentary evidence supporting
the existence of assets and liabilities before attesting to a set
of financial statements to at least making sure that the

68 Berton, "Laventhol
unit and Key Executives,"
~ Ibid.

& Horwath
p. A-2.
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companies being reported on existed.

Did Laventhol follow even

these rudimentary guidelines in the Grabill case?
The trustee appointed to handle the affairs of the now
bankrupt Grabill corporation along with the accounting firm of
KPMG Peat Marwick were able to find only $128 million of the $390
million in assets which were reported in the '88 financial
statements.70

Included

as assets

were

a number

of shell

companies with little or no value, but which appeared in the
financial statements at up to $60 million each.71 There were
three

companies

totaling
Also

with

assets

$5.3 million

lacking

totaling

for which

supporting

$30 million

no records

records

were

and sales
found

was all but $521,000

at all.72
of real

estate which was listed in the Grabill statements at $74
million.73 There was confusion about whether the records
actually did not exist, or if they merely could not be found.
Even records indicating the existence of the corporate
headquarters

itself could not be found at the corporate offices.

None of the missing records were ever reported as being found.
Probably even more highly publicized than the Grabill
financial statements were stoecker's personal financial
statements which were also prepared by Laventhol & Horwath.

70 Sly,
p.
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find chunk
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stoecker's

personal

interesting.
estate,

They

and cash

financial
claimed

statements

were

equally

that he had $74 million

and stocks

amounting

in real-

to $220 million.

The

financials reported stoecker's personal fortune in excess of $500
million.~

The personal trustee which was appointed to handle

stoecker's affairs determined, however, that he was $50 million
in the hole

and that he owed

documentary

evidence

$153 million

was found

to 32 lenders.

for the existence

were reported as stoecker's personal assets.

No

of 22 firms

that

These firms were

listed as being worth $551 million and having assets of $817
million.7s Then there was Chandler Enterprises which was valued
at $63 million.

for a loan.
machining

stoecker

offered

Chandler's

assets

as collateral

He said that Chandler was a "diverse manufacture

house."

The company,

however,

did not exist.

and

Chandler

was one of five stoecker-owned companies that were reported by
Laventhol & Horwath as being collectively worth $232 million.

In

a "60 Minutes" episode on January 14, 1990 during which Bill
stoecker was interviewed, it was reported that "their actual
value

was

close

to

zero.

,,76 Another

company,

Kimberton

Corp.,

was listed as one of stoecker's personal assets and his financial
statements indicated he had a $26 million dollar interest in the
company.

However, the only asset that the company had was a $10

74 Gelber,
7S Sly,
p.

"Whiz Kid,"

"Ex-Grabill

p. 4.

chief's

assets

5.

76 Gelber, "Whiz Kid,"

p.

5.

come up 22 firms

short,"
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million dollar leased aircraft.n

It is instances such as these

which point to possible fraud in the preparation of the financial
statements, instead of merely inadequate work.
Court-appointed

bankruptcy trustees were saying from the

beginning that "Laventhol & Horwath's financial statements were
riddled with falsehoods."

So the question arises about whether

the auditors had done a reasonable investigation or if they were
negligent in their audit work.

There are surrounding facts that

would point to the answer as being negligence or perhaps even
fraud.

The fact that

obvious misstatements
Laventhol.

the financials

contained

such

large,

would seem to indicate negligence by

Additionally,

it was reported that Laventhol was

receiving audit fees of $158,000 per month78 and that they
received over $2 million in fees during 1988.79 The level of
audit fees in this case has been reported as "unheard of."

The

excessive fees also raise questions of possible fraud in
association with Laventhol's work.

In their defense, 60 minutes

reported that Laventhol may plead that they were dealing with "a
cunning criminal" and that they could not have been equipped to
deal with the sorts of situations they encountered.

But the fact

that there were nonexistent companies in question raises serious
doubts about the adequacy of their audit work and thus the

n O'Dea,
78 Gelber,
~ Elsner

"Why Laventhol's
"Whiz Kid,"
and Sly,

ineptitude?" p. 3.

perils

won't

fade,"

p. 27.

p. 4.

"Grabill

case:

Matter

of fraud

or

33

validity of this defense.

"You find a nonexistent company by

going out and kicking the tires.
tires?

Did they go out and kick the

Did they actually physically go out and try and look at

one of those

nonexistent

companies?,,80

The answer

fairly

clearly

seems to be "no," and thus there is little that would indicate
that there was anything short of gross negligence or fraud in
this

case.

Laventhol faced certain litigation for its involvement with
Grabill Corporation and also for the personal financial
information they audited for William stoecker.

Laventhol agreed

to pay Grabill Corporation's creditors $30 million in an out-ofcourt settlement
Laventhol's

(of which only $20 million was covered by

insurance).

As of December

1990,

Laventhol

had made

no settlement on a lawsuit concerning stoecker's personal
financial statements.

The sale of Stoecker's personal assets

during the bankruptcy proceedings amounted to only $35 million
despite the fact that the Laventhol & Horwath statements
suggested that Stoecker's personal net worth was over $500
million.

Additionally,

the trustee in charge of Stoecker's

estate, Thomas Raleigh, is still trying to recover another $30
million in two lawsuits.

One of these lawsuits involves an

alleged fraudulent transfer of $25 million to First Union Bank of
North Carolina, which Stoecker tried to repay just before
bankruptcy.

81

80 Gelber,
81 Orr,

"Whiz Kid,"

"Stoecker

p. 6.

empire

vanishes

in sale,"

p.

1.
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The other $5 million which Raleigh is attempting to recover
is in a suit against stoecker's former wife Grace.
they were divorced

At the time

(summer 1988), Stoecker said he lost Grace "in

the struggle to figure out how rich people live.

He cluttered

their

housekeepers,

lives

chauffeurs,
socialized
divorce

with

butlers,

nannies,

and the ever-present
and shared

might

meals

also have

with

related

chefs,

pilots,

bodyguards
the young

(all of whom
couple...).

to complaints

from

,,82 Their

Stoecker's

secretaries to the EEOC who claimed that Stoecker had made
advances towards them and then fired them when they shunned him.
At the time the divorce took place, the $5 million divorce
settlement made it look like Grace either knew the financial
statements were
Considering

or she was cutting herself a bad deal.

w:r-ong,

Stoecker's actual negative net worth, the $5 million

would have been a real good settlement; and the trustee wants it

back.83
The End:
BankruDtcy.
Unable to acquire needed cash through either bank loans or
partner contributions,
in November of 1990.

Laventhol & Horwath filed for bankruptcy
Prior to the filing, sources were reporting

I
I

Laventhol's net worth to be negative (down from $60 million the

I

year before)

.

84

Upon filing, however,

it was determined that

"the accounting firm and its partners face vastly larger
I

I

I

I

82

Silberman,

~ Orr,

"The Fall of the House

"Stoecker

84 Cohen,

empire

"Laventhol

vanishes

breakup

of Stoecker,"

in sale,"

call hinted,"

p. 1.
p. 1.

p. 179.
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potential liabilities than had previously been indicated."

The

firm was facing about 100 lawsuits at the time of the bankruptcy
which were seeking more than $2 billion in settlements.

A Wall

street Journal article reported that "Laventhol has been beset by
costly litigation claims and softness in business, particularly
,,85 Previously, papers had reported that
in consulting services.
consulting services was a tremendous growth area, but that most
litigation had resulted from sloppy audits.
"In the filing, Laventhol listed assets of $146.4 million
including $81 million in net receivables, and property and
equipment of $50.5 million.

The liabilities include $76.8

million in bank debts, principally Chase Manhattan Bank and
Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia, and $37.8 million listed as a
long-term portion of litigation settlements payable.
sheet

showed

a partners'

deficit

of

$6.9

85 Pae, "Laventhol Bankruptcy Filing
May Be As Much As $2 Billion," p. A-4.
86

Ibid.

The balance

million.,,86

Indicates

Liabilities
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CHAPTER
TODAY'S

4

ACCOUNTING

INDUSTRY

While it would perhaps be easy to close summarizing the
downfall of Laventhol as due to its own shortcomings

in terms of

the quality of its work, it must be noted that Laventhol is not
alone in the problems it has faced.

Perhaps they are the first

large public accounting firm to declare bankruptcy, but others
seem to be experiencing

similar legal problems and, in fact, the

accounting industry as a whole seems to be facing some difficult

times.
Other Firms Encounterina Difficult Times.
It seems that a number of accounting firms are currently
facing hard times.

Ernst & Young has been heavily involved in

the S&L industry and they began to run advertisements
newspapers

in

such as The Wall street Journal and The New York Times

declaring that the company is "in very strong financial
condition."

The press was also running other articles,

indicating that this move was apparently made to dispel rumors
that Ernst & Young might also be considering bankruptcy.

They

deny that they have considered such a step, despite the fact that
they are being sued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
for $560 million in connection with Arthur Young work for a
Western Savings Association

in Dallas.

Ernst & Young also faces

litigation in connection with their predecessor's
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association,

audits of

"the largest thrift failure
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in the U.S.," as well as Vernon Savings & Loan Association

in

Dallas.87 In fact, it is because of Arthur Young's audits in
connection with the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association that the
State of California's

licensing board is trying to revoke Ernst &

Young's license to practice accounting in that state.88
Coopers & Lybrand are also currently facing problems related
to work in the S&L industry.

Coopers paid a penalty to federal

thrift regulators that charged the firm with "materially
understating potential losses" in connection with a 1986 audit of
Silverado Banking, Savings & Loan Association.

Coopers neither

admitted or denied the charges, but rather paid the penalty in
order to avoid the expense and publicity that would arise with a
trial.

The case marked the first action taken against a Big Six

accounting firm by the Office of Thrift Supervision.

The thrift

office charged that the 1986 audited financial statements
reported capital "improperly inflated by $14 million," and that
the "allowance for loan losses of $23 million should have been
roughly

$35 million

higher."

Another manifestation

of the present problems firms are

having is the case of Spicer & Oppenheim.

Spicer & Oppenheim

decided to disband because of the "weakening economy and the
continual

defection

of partners

and staff."

Stephen

Oppenheim,

the son of the founder and who was the firm's chairman, expressed

87

It May
88

Pae, "Ernst & Young, In Full-Page Ads, Seeks To End Rumors
Seek Chapter

11," p. A-5.

Cowan, "California Might Void Ernst License," p.

D-3.
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his belief that other firms will experience similar problems
because of the present condition of the industry.

Although

Spicer had relatively few litigation claims, the firm had cash
flow problems due in part to slowing growth in the industry.
Spicer & Oppenheim also "overextended" itself by entering into an
expensive lease for office space in Manhattan.

Finally, Spicer &

Oppenheim claimed that since many of its clients were securities
firms, when the stock market crashed in 1990, this too hurt their
business.

89

The list of major accounting firms facing litigation and
cash shortages could continue to go on.

The above-mentioned

cases are just a sample of the problems that some of the major
accounting firms are facing today.
for accounting firms right now.

Times are clearly difficult

In addition to the firms

mentioned above, even Peat Marwick and Deloitte & Touche began
laying off administrative

employees in December of 1990 to

streamline their operations and help to reduce the effect of the
present economy.w
Chanaina Attitudes
Towards Risk.
Lawsuits against accountants

are changing

accountants'

attitudes toward risk and the increasing number of lawsuits are
having a dramatic effect on the industry.

A survey conducted by

Johnson & Higgins, a New York insurance broker, stated that four
89 Pae, "Spicer & Oppenheim Partners
Obligations
with Creditors,"
p. C-15.
W

B-7.

Approve

Plan to Settle

"Two Big Accounting Firms Begin Layoffs of Personnel," p.
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out of five certified public accountants have cut back on the
services

they

provide.

Of the 500 accountants

polled,

56 percent

have stopped doing business with what they considered to be "high
risk" clients.

Also, 98 percent of those polled now ask clients

to sign some type of protective contract before they begin work.
Although S&Ls top the list of businesses accountants are
avoiding, accountants are also wary of start-up companies and
companies

making

initial

public

offerings.
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The present situation of the accounting industry is really
taking its toll on insurance costs.

One partner of a mid-sized

accounting firm noted that in the mid-80's he was paying about
$30,000 a year for $7 million in coverage.

Today he pays

$200,000 for only $5 million.~

Accountant
Liabilitv
, the "DeeD pockets" Theorv.
The increased litigation against accountants

has been

referred to as the "deep pockets" theory by many in the field.
The name refers to the fact that it is often the accountants
(among others) which shareholders and other plaintiffs sue when a
business fails because it is the accounting firms that have the
money while obviously the failed businesses do not.

Lawrence

Weinbach, chief executive of Arthur Andersen & Co.'s worldwide
organization has said, "The 'deep pockets' theory [under which
the parties with the most assets may wind up paying all legal
91

marginal

caprino, "Fear of lawsuits has CPA firms turning away
business,"

~ Ibid.

p. 3.
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damages] is absolutely incorrect."

He and others feel that

auditors and other parties should be liable in relation to the
extent that their roles played in the failure.93 Under this
theory, it has also been suggested that an accounting firm's best
defense is not having insurance against litigation.

"They don't

want your house, they want money," is what one accountant said
about those who are suing accounting firms.~
Perhaps the worst part of the accounting profession's
situation lies in the fact that most state statutes require
accounting organizations to be run as partnerships rather than
corporations.

Under partnership law, partners are personally

liable for any deficit resulting from a lawsuit.

What is so

ironic is that accountants have set their own standard of
liability in their codes which denote their level of
responsibility.

The state laws on liability, in turn, mirror the

accountants' own codes.
Accounting

Additionally, new statements on

Standards have been issued in an attempt to reconcile

some of the dispute over what the auditor's responsibilities
Dubbed

the

"expectation

gap"

standards,

these

standards

are.

are

resulting in the auditor taking increasingly higher levels of
responsibility

for the work they perform.

"Members of the

institute soon will be asked to vote on amending the group's code
of professional

~ Cohen,
~

conduct to allow public accounting firms to

"Party's

over as CPAs face tough

times,"

p. 4.

caprino, "Lawsuit-wary CPAs shun risky clients," p.

6.
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function as limited-liability

corporations.

will

to be hurled

But a favorable vote
,,95

only

serve

95 Caprino,

as

ammunition

"Notion

of liability

accountants' own code," p.

6.

at

lawmakers.

for partners

built

into
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CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSIONS

If one could go back in time, they would not have to go back
very far to enter a time in which the bankruptcy of an accounting
firm like Laventhol & Horwath would have seemed impossible.
However, amidst the changes taking place in the accounting
industry today and the increasing competition in the industry,
there has been a plethora of lawsuits that seek to find
accountants

liable for business failures.

accounting firm is a reality.

Bankruptcy of an

Laventhol & Horwath filed for

Chapter 11; Spicer & Oppenheim decided to dissolve rather than
seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection; and other firms have
become increasingly concerned with the trend of lawsuits against
auditing firms.

For some firms, it may be a matter of the "deep

pockets" theory; if a business fails, blame the accountant.

But

for Laventhol, the problem went much deeper than just the deep
pocket theory.

With the poor audit work exhibited in Grabill,

PTL, Terra Drill & Oil, and other engagements, it would seem that
Laventhol dug its own grave.
Grabill/Stoecker

In the highly publicized

case, there was evidence that virtually nothing

was done to verify the existence of major assets.

Indeed to

some, it seemed Laventhol would have vouched for anything-- if
the fee was right.
The reputation of former Laventhol employees will
undoubtedly

suffer too.

Although many of Laventhol's former
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partners have found jobs with other accounting firms, these firms
will no doubt keep a close watch on these partners to ensure they
are capable of doing quality work.

But perhaps it is the staff

level employees whose reputations will suffer the most.
Surrounded by the inadequate work Laventhol was producing, one
must wonder how valuable of a learning experience these employees
received in their time at Laventhol.
Although it was their involvement with Grabill and william
Stoecker which eventually slammed the door shut on Laventhol,
this was only one example of numerous problems at Laventhol.
Laventhol seemed to be grossly negligent in many of these cases;
however, it has become increasingly common for accountants to be
named in lawsuits which are not so clear-cut.
cases the accountants
deep pockets.

Indeed in some

seem to be pursued only because of their

As a result, a number of changes have already

begun to take shape within the accounting profession to guard
against incompetent work and to protect the firms from frivolous
lawsuits.

The following pages contain a number of observations

and thoughts concerning the condition of today's accounting
industry.

The EXDectation
GaD Standards.
The accounting
industry needs

to find a way to clarify

the public should expect of it, and what it should not.

what

While

Laventhol clearly didn't do its job, this is not so obvious in
many

of the other

lawsuits.

Just because

a client

goes bankrupt,
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doesn't mean that the auditors haven't done their job or that
they should get sued.
What can the industry do about the abundance of lawsuits it
is facing today?

Well, the recent issuance of the nine

"expectation gap" standards seems to be a step in the right
direction.

In order for someone to sue an accounting firm, there

should be a sound basis for determining where the auditors failed
in their responsibilities.

In the past there has been confusion

concerning the auditor's exact responsibilities.

The auditor's

perception of his or her responsibilities was different than the
pUblic's perception.

In attempting to clarify this issue, the

expectation gap standards resulted in the auditor assuming a
higher degree of responsibility than they had in the past.
new standards have increased the auditor's responsibility
detect

and report

errors,

irregularities,

and illegal

The
to

acts.

The

standards also increase the auditor's responsibility to consider
internal control as well as requiring analytical procedures in
both the planning and final review stages of the audit.

Finally,

the standards have changed the language of the auditor's report
including "new reporting requirements in the areas of going
concern, internal control and audit committees."

with any luck,

these new standards will clarify to the public the degree of
responsibility

the auditor has accepted and, hopefully, will help
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to reduce the lawsuits against public accounting firms in the
future.96

Peer Reviews.
More extensive

peer reviews

can also help

identify

and

eliminate some of the poor practices that are occurring at some
accounting firms.

While peer reviews are still a fairly new form

of regulation in the industry, they are becoming increasingly
more common.

Peer reviews have now become part of the

regulations of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms and, although
membership

in this organization is still voluntary, firms who

register with the Division must meet certain practice
requirements and submit to mandatory peer reviews.

The practice

requirements refer mainly to maintenance of appropriate quality
controls and the imposition of sanctions for members failing to
meet membership requirements.

If peer reviews prove to be

effective, perhaps someday they will become mandatory for all
firms.

with the many audit problems which are unfolding in the

S&L scandal and the numerous lawsuits against firms (like
Laventhol) where the work didn't seem up to par, perhaps peer
review might have highlighted these problems before things got as
bad as they did.
Limited Liabilitv corDorations.
Another way that auditors might seek to limit their
vulnerability

to lawsuits is through changing the organizational

96 Guy and Winters,

"Implementing

Auditing standards," p. V.

the Expectation

Gap
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form of accounting firms to limited liability corporations.
Perhaps it is not a bad idea to allow the partners to protect at
least their personal assets from frivolous suits; however, the
corporate form of organization should not be allowed to become a
haven to allow the accounting industry to hide from their
responsibility

to produce high quality work.

A distinguishing

mark of the aUditing profession has been that the partners take a
high degree of responsibility
modification

for the work of their firms.

If

to the corporate form of organization is viewed as

an attempt to shirk their responsibilities,

it could adversely

affect the pUblic's confidence in the entire industry.
Not Just the Accountant's Fault.
It is easy to claim that it was the accountant's fault that
Grabill was able to procure so many millions of dollars in loans
from banks, but the banks were not without fault.

Many of the

loans which stoecker obtained for himself or Grabill were
obtained without audited financial statements.

Remember, too,

that the Bank of New England had loaned Grabill $150 million
while requiring no collateral because of Grabill's apparent
financial strength.

While it is true that Grabill looked like a

sound company according to it's poorly prepared financial
statements, no bank should lend such sums of money without its
own thorough investigation and without collateral.

While

Laventhol should not be excused for its inadequate work in the
Grabill case, the accounting profession cannot be blamed for the
shortcomings of other professionals.
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It seems almost obvious that many lawsuits are
blame the accountants with the "deep pockets" every
business gets in trouble, and this is simply unfair.

looking to
time a
This is not

to excuse the quality problems that Laventhol exhibited

(they

should be held accountable for these), but there appears to be
many lawsuits where it is unclear as to whether the accountants
really did anything wrong.

Where the profession has done its

job, the profession needs to be guarded against frivolous suits
naming accounting firms simply because they have money and
insurance.

The Industrv Must Not Foraet Its Function.
Last, but definitely most important, the Grabill case must
remind the accounting industry what it is paid for and relied
upon to do:

to kick the tires!

An auditor's function is to lend

credibility to financial statements.

An audit should follow

generally accepted auditing standards, and when these standards
are followed, any accounting firm should be able to render the
proper opinion on financial statements.

In this way, many people

believe that an audit is merely a commodity.

In other words, as

long as there is an opinion, it should not matter who audited the
information.

However, with cases like that of Laventhol, the

question arises if an audit is merely a commodity or if an
opinion from one firm lends more credibility than an opinion from
another.

It is very embarrassing to the profession that an

accounting firm could give an unqualified opinion on financial
statements listing company after company that did not exist.

One

48

instance of a Laventhol employee questioning the firm's work was
discussed in conjunction with the Terra Drill & oil case.

The

public undoubtedly wonders what all the Laventhol "professionals"
were doing while so many poor audits were occurring.
The third standard of field work states that "Sufficient
competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection,
observation,

inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable

basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
examination."

Theoretically,

if an accounting firm gathers

evidence to support their opinion, they will not be found
negligent even if their opinion later appears to be incorrect.
In the Grabill/Stoecker

case, however, company after company

listed as assets on the financial statements did not even exist.
Clearly there was no attempt to collect sufficient competent
evidential matter concerning the existence of these assets.

If

Laventhol had tried to verify the existence of even one of these
companies, they should have quickly determined something was
wrong.

If on the other hand, Laventhol knew the financial

statements were materially misstated, and verified them anyway
for a high audit fee, this once again badly hurts the reputation
of the profession.
The scope paragraph of the independent auditor's report

reminds us that "generally accepted auditing standards

require

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement."

Because auditors work with cost/benefit

..
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constraints,
assurance

the auditor

does not promise

that the financial

professionals

statements

to provide

absolute

are correct.

However,

in the public accounting industry should not

associate themselves with giving even reasonable assurance about
the accuracy of financials unless they have done enough work,
asked enough questions, and looked at enough evidence to give
such an opinion.
Whatever the future may hold, one thing remains sure.
Accounting firms need to act now to maintain the reputation of
their profession.

Accounting firms must be sure that the public

understands the degree of responsibility they are taking, and the
firms must be sure that their audits provide the degree of
assurance that their audit opinion promises.

When these things

become clear, perhaps then there will not be so many lawsuits
against accountants, blaming them for improper opinions and
business failures.

But while trying to limit their vulnerability

to lawsuits, the approach must be to further define the auditors
responsibilities,
responsibility

not to develop ways to minimize the

auditors assume.

Surely there is a lot to be

learned from the problems the accounting industry is now facing.
Let us hope that the firms learn from their mistakes to prevent
history from repeating itself.
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